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1. And the most important
non-EU transit country,
Ukraine.
2. In January 2006, after a
long-lasting disagreement
on natural gas prices,
Russia cut off supplies to
Ukraine for three days,
Ukraine diverted volumes
destined to Europe and as a
consequence natural gas
supply to some central
European countries fell
briefly. A second crisis
occurred in 2009, when the
transit of Russian gas
through Ukraine was com-
pletely halted for two
weeks, resulting in a severe
crisis in several central and
eastern European coun-
tries. For a detailed discus-
sion of these two crises see
Stern (2006) and Pirani,
Stern and Yafimava (2009).
3. “The EU will use all its for-
eign policy instruments to
establish strategic energy
partnerships with increas-
ingly important producing
and transit countries ...
such as ... Turkey.”
THE 2014 UKRAINE CRISIS brought energy secu-
rity concerns back onto the European Union's
agenda when policymakers realised that the
threat of supply disruptions from the EU's main
natural gas supplier, Russia1, reduced their politi-
cal room for manoeuvre. In the debate on EU
energy security, Poland's then-prime minister
Donald Tusk coined the term ‘Energy Union’ to
highlight that only a European solution could sen-
sibly resolve the systemic energy supply threat
to various member states (Tusk, 2014). This dis-
cussion was quickly broadened into a debate
about EU energy and climate policy generally. The
wide-ranging Energy Union concept was then
taken up by the new European Commission under
Jean-Claude Juncker, which made the creation of
an Energy Union one of its flagship projects when
it took office in November 2014. Juncker created
the post of Commission Vice-President for Energy
Union. The Energy Union Communication pub-
lished in February 2015 was one of the first strate-
gic documents of the new Commission (European
Commission, 2015a).
The Energy Union Communication has five inter-
linked parts: energy security, solidarity and trust;
a fully integrated European energy market; energy
efficiency contributing to moderation of demand;
decarbonisation of the economy; and research,
innovation and competitiveness. Given the origins
of the document it is no surprise that energy secu-
rity is mentioned first. Energy security should be
safeguarded by reducing energy consumption,
strengthening the internal exchange of energy
and diversifying energy supplies. While reducing
consumption and improving energy markets
relate to the second and third parts of the Energy
Union (internal market and energy efficiency),
diversification measures are seen as the core of
energy security. 
In the debate on diversification of imports, the
focus has been on natural gas because it can only
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be imported through expensive infrastructure and
has been at the origin of several security-of-
supply crises in the past decade. Natural gas is at
the centre of the current supply-security concerns
arising from the Ukraine-Russia conflict. To diver-
sify the sources of Europe's natural gas imports,
the Commission wants to stimulate the construc-
tion of new infrastructure and address the issue
of higher liquefied natural gas (LNG) prices. As far
as natural gas pipelines are concerned, the Com-
mission seeks the reinforcement of the Southern
Gas Corridor (SGC) initiative, which was launched
in 2008 (European Commission, 2008) as a
response to the EU's energy security concerns
emerged after the first Russian-Ukrainian-Euro-
pean natural gas crisis2: “To ensure the diversifi-
cation in gas supplies, work on the SGC must be
intensified to enable Central Asian countries to
export their natural gas to Europe” (Figure 1).
Given the pivotal role of Turkey in the corridor, the
Commission calls for the establishment of a
strategic energy partnership with Turkey3.
In this Policy Contribution, we discuss what the EU
and Turkey can realistically expect from the strate-
gic gas partnership, and make recommendations
EU Energy Union
Energy security
Energy efficiency Internal market Diversification
Internal market
Energy efficiency
Decarbonisation
Research, innovation and competitiveness
Southern Gas Corridor
EU-Turkey SEP*
Figure 1: The Southern Gas Corridor's place in
the EU Energy Union framework
Source: Bruegel. Note: * Strategic Energy Partnership.
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that should enable the mutual benefits to be max-
imised. We mainly focus on the SGC, but also
assess the potential impact on the EU-Turkey gas
partnership of the recently announced Turkish
Stream project.
We do this with two caveats. First, neither the over-
all EU natural-gas diversification strategy nor the
SGC should be seen as an attempt to completely
replace Russian natural gas supplies to Europe.
This would be difficult, considering the existing
volumes and the long-term contracts. The Com-
mission's strategy is rather to ensure that no
source, supplier or route has an excessive share
of the EU natural gas supply architecture, and to
enhance competition in those markets (south-
east Europe) that are more exposed to Russian
supply predominance.
Second, a diversification option such as the SGC
will most likely be more costly than Russian natu-
ral gas supplies via the existing infrastructure.
However, considering that energy security has a
value, the EU should be ready to pay this price as
insurance against disruptions of supply from a
major supplier. This rationale also applies to the
micro level of EU natural gas companies. In fact,
companies are willing to pay premiums to have
4. For instance, Engie's
largest supplier, Norway,
supplies 26 percent of its
portfolio, Russia supplies
27 percent of E.ON Ruhrgas
AG's portfolio, Algeria sup-
plies 31 percent of Gas Nat-
ural Fenosa's portfolio,
Russia supplies 32 percent
of Eni's portfolio.
well-diversified portfolios. This trend is illustrated
by the already variegated composition of EU com-
panies' portfolios, which generally include two key
suppliers and a series of minor suppliers4.
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU-TURKEY ENERGY
RELATIONSHIP: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT
Because of its strategic geographical location at
the crossroads of gas-rich countries in the
Caspian, Middle East, Eastern Mediterranean and
Europe, Turkey has progressively emerged over
the last decade as a potentially game-changing
player in the future EU natural gas security-of-
supply architecture.
In particular, since the launch of the SGC initiative
in 2008 the Commission has  stressed the poten-
tial role of Turkey as key transit country for Euro-
pean gas imports (Tagliapietra, 2014b).
The SGC has become a key component of the EU
energy security strategy because it would con-
tribute to the reduction of the perceived EU over-
dependence on Russian natural gas supplies by
allowing new supplies from the Caspian and
Middle Eastern regions to reach Europe, and would
meet the objective of creating more competition
Figure 2: The Southern Gas Corridor's contribution to EU security of supply for natural gas
Source: Bruegel based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2015.
5. The Commission part-
funded a feasibility study.
6. Natural gas from Azerbai-
jan would have reached the
Turkish border via the South
Caucasus Pipeline; from
Turkmenistan it would have
come via Iran or the
planned Trans-Caspian
Pipeline; from Iraq it would
have come via the planned
extension to the Arab Gas
Pipeline.
7. For the EU, Nabucco was
a major opportunity to
diversify its natural gas
supplies. For Turkey, it rep-
resented an opportunity to
realise its long-term strate-
gic objective of becoming a
key energy hub. For the US,
it represented a major
geopolitical asset to reduce
EU dependence on Russia
for natural gas, exactly as
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline in the 1990s
reduced EU dependence on
Russia for oil.
8. OMV of Austria, MOL
Group of Hungary, Bul-
gargaz of Bulgaria, Transgaz
of Romania and BOTAS of
Turkey. RWE joined the con-
sortium in 2008.
9. Because of the invest-
ments already made in its
Shah Deniz natural gas
field, and because of the
need to make a final invest-
ment decision for Shah
Deniz Phase II (which was
concluded on 17 December
2013).
10. The intergovernmental
agreement signed by the
five transit countries in
2009 provided a legal
framework for 50 years,
confirming that 50 percent
of the pipeline’s capacity
was to be reserved for the
shareholders of the project
and the remaining 50 per-
cent was to be offered to
third-party shippers on the
basis of a regulatory transit
regime under EU law.
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on southern and eastern European natural gas
markets.
The rise and fall of Nabucco
The focus on the SGC translated into EU political
and financial support for Nabucco5, the proposed
3,800 kilometre pipeline with a capacity of 31 bil-
lion cubic metres per year (bcm/y), intended to
carry natural gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan,
Iraq and Iran to south-east and central Europe via
Turkey6.
Thanks to the political backing from the EU, Turkey
and the United States7, the Nabucco project grad-
ually advanced from the signing in 2005 of the
joint venture agreement between the five compa-
nies initially involved8, to the signing in 2011 of
the project support agreements between the
Nabucco consortium and each of the five transit
countries (Austria, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria
and Turkey) (Novinite, 2011).
However, notwithstanding the strong commitment
of the five transit countries and the unprece-
dented support of the EU and the US, the Nabucco
project ultimately failed for a variety of commer-
cial and financial reasons, such as a weak outlook
for EU natural gas demand, uncertain deliverabil-
ity of supplies, potential competition from the
Russian South Stream pipeline that was supposed
to bring gas from Russia through the Black Sea to
Bulgaria, and lack of guarantees or long-term ship-
or-pay contracts that would facilitate access to
bank loans (Hafner, 2012).
The failure of Nabucco had significant implications
not only for the evolution of the SGC but also for
the evolution of the overall EU-Turkey energy rela-
tionship.
The Southern Gas Corridor after Nabucco
The difficulties encountered by the Nabucco proj-
ect paved the way for the emergence of a new ver-
sion of the SGC, promoted by the only available
regional supplier: Azerbaijan9. In 2011 Azerbaijan
signed a memorandum of understanding with
Turkey on the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), a
project very different to Nabucco in terms of initial
capacity (16 bcm/y) and especially in terms of
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Figure 3: Turkey's natural gas demand, 2000-14,
and import portfolio 2014 (bcm)
Source: Bruegel based on BP Statistical Review of World
Energy, June 2015.
legal structure. Nabucco, being a project com-
pletely under EU law, was subject to rules such as
third-party access and unbundling throughout its
entire length10. By contrast, considering that
Turkey has not yet adopted the EU energy acquis
in its legislation, Azerbaijan – with a major stake
in the TANAP project – will in practice control the
pipeline and all natural gas transit through it. Con-
sidering both Turkey’s reluctance to enter the EU
Energy Community11 and the difficulties related to
the opening of the energy chapter of Turkey’s EU
accession process, this situation is also unlikely
to change in the foreseeable future.
The EU-Turkey energy relationship after Nabucco
The Nabucco odyssey and the emergence of
TANAP highlighted a difference in the way the EU
and Turkey perceived the SGC and their energy
relationship more broadly.
After years of cooperation with the EU on Nabucco,
Turkey decided to change its approach and turn to
Azerbaijan to speed-up the development of the
SGC via TANAP. There were two key reasons for this.
First, as noted in Turkey's energy strategy, “the pri-
mary aim of Turkey is to realise its own energy
security”12. Considering its rapidly growing
demand for natural gas and its over-reliance on
Russian supplies (Figure 3), natural gas diversifi-
cation is a key energy policy priority for Turkey.
Second, the choice was driven by Turkey's gen-
uine discontent with the EU about the continuous
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11. The reason for Turkey’s
reluctance is clearly
described by Barysch
(2007, p.6): “Turkey says
that there are technical
problems with some of the
Energy Community Treaty’s
provisions. But more funda-
mentally, it does not like
the idea of unilaterally sign-
ing up to a big chunk of the
acquis without being able
to ask anything in return.
Turkish officials say that
such an arrangement may
suit countries that are not
eligible for membership. But
Turkey is already an EU
candidate and it does not
want to be fobbed off with
what it sees as a ‘privileged
partnership’ in the energy
field”.
12. Republic of Turkey Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs,
Turkey’s Energy Strategy,
available online.
13. For a detailed discus-
sion, see Korany and Sartori
(2013).
14. If not otherwise stated,
all energy statistics in this
paper are from BP (2015).
procrastination in the accession negotiations in
general and the EU's vagueness about the opening
of the energy chapter in particular13.
Implications of the current impasse
Since the failure of Nabucco, the EU-Turkey energy
relationship has lost momentum. This situation is
in the strategic interests of neither the EU nor
Turkey. A coherent and actively coordinated
approach to the SGC would have allowed the two
players to pursue their respective interests in a
more effective way.
In fact, a joint EU-Turkey diplomatic effort directed
at the natural-gas producing countries in the
region might have considerably enhanced the
possibility of translating the availability of regional
natural gas resources into deliverable supplies. In
particular, a coherent approach to the develop-
ment of regional infrastructure might have allowed
the political and commercial barriers that have tra-
ditionally undermined the regional natural gas
potential to be overcome.
Establishing a strategic energy partnership with
Turkey would be a move in the right direction. The
opportunity should be fully seized and managed
in a way that will avoid the mistakes of the past.
A solid EU-Turkey strategic energy partnership
should be founded on a realistic assessment of
the regional potential to deliver natural gas sup-
plies. In the past, too much emphasis has been
placed on the regional availability of resources,
without always taking into account that in natural
gas markets, availability of resources does not
automatically imply that they can be delivered.
For this reason, in the next section we provide an
overview of the regional natural gas producing
countries, to better clarify the future potential for
exports to the EU and Turkey. For each country, we
also describe how the EU and Turkey might work
together for the best outcomes.
THE SOUTHERN GAS CORRIDOR: REGIONAL
PRODUCERS
Azerbaijan: the SGC front-runner
If there is a certainty about the SGC, it is Azerbai-
jan, with 1.2 trillion cubic metres (tcm) of natural
gas reserves14. Azerbaijan has since 2007 sup-
plied the Turkish market with about 5 bcm/y via
the South Caucasus Pipeline (Rzayeva, 2014).
With the ongoing development of the second
phase of the offshore Shah Deniz field, Azerbaijan
Figure 4: The Southern Gas Corridor, gas reserves and pipeline projects
Source: Bruegel based on BP Statistical Review of World Energy, June 2015.
15. On this issue, the EU
and the World Bank have
financed a study that will be
published by end of 2015.
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Pipeline (TCP) to deliver Turkmenistan's natural
gas to Turkey and eventually to Europe (Socor,
2006, p.27). This idea was rekindled in 2006,
when the EU sought to diversify its natural-gas
supply in the aftermath of the first Russian-Ukrain-
ian-European natural gas crisis. However, the EU's
efforts to promote this pipeline project have failed
because of the complex geopolitical situation of
the region. In particular, the major barrier to the
development of the TCP is the international dis-
pute over the legal status of the Caspian Sea.
Russia and Iran have traditionally claimed the
Caspian to be a lake in legal terms in order to apply
customary international law concerning border
lakes, instead of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (Janusz, 2005). If the Caspian
is regarded as a lake, Russia and Iran could pre-
vent the development of the TCP.
Taking into account this situation, Turkmenistan
looked eastwards and agreed a major natural gas
partnership with China that culminated in the con-
struction of the 30 bcm/y Turkmenistan-China
Pipeline (via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan), inau-
gurated in 2009. This outcome marked a suc-
cessful strategic policy initiative on the part of the
Chinese government, which in a timely way con-
cluded agreements with Turkmenistan to con-
struct the pipeline and to consistently involve
Chinese companies in upstream production. This
special relationship is set to further deepen in the
near future, with the expansion of this pipeline to
a capacity of 65 bcm/y by 2020 (Pirani, 2012).
Considering its huge, untapped, natural gas
reserves, Turkmenistan could well supply both
China and Europe in the future. However, the
prospect of Turkmenistan exporting natural gas to
the EU via Turkey will continue to depend on the
resolution of the legal dispute over the status of
the Caspian Sea and on the clarification of envi-
ronmental concerns relating to the TCP project15.
In the aftermath of the 2014 Ukraine crisis, the
European Commission reinvigorated its diplomatic
efforts towards Turkmenistan. This effort culmi-
nated on 1 May 2015 with the adoption of the Ash-
gabat Declaration between Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan, Turkey and the EU. The parties
declared their commitment to cooperate on legal,
commercial, technical and other issues related to
will export additional 6 bcm/y to Turkey by
2018/19 and also 10 bcm/y to Europe by 2020.
On the basis of a final investment decision
reached in December 2013 (BP, 2013b), the new
16 bcm/y will flow to Turkey through an expanded
version of the South Caucasus Pipeline and TANAP,
the construction of which started in March 2015
(Euractiv, 2015). The 10 bcm/y destined for Euro-
pean markets will then pass through the Trans-
Adriatic Pipeline (TAP), which will connect TANAP
and Italy via Greece and Albania. Sale agreements
have already been signed with companies oper-
ating in Italy (for a total of 8 bcm/y), Greece and
Bulgaria (for the remaining 2 bcm/y) (BP, 2013a).
After 2025, more natural gas might become avail-
able on the basis of the development of further
phases of Shah Deniz (Interfax Global Energy,
2014) and also on the basis of the development of
new fields.
Because of the well-established energy partner-
ship between Azerbaijan and Turkey, and also con-
sidering the infrastructure already in place and
that now under construction, the role of Azerbai-
jan in the SGC can be considered secure. In fact,
the TANAP-TAP pipeline-tandem represents a good
example of a win-win solution for all the players
involved.
In order to strengthen the current, positive, coop-
eration approach and to secure future additional
developments, the EU should engage with Turkey,
Azerbaijan and Georgia in a structured platform of
dialogue to coordinate regional natural gas trade
issues. This would build on cooperation so far and
offer new cooperation opportunities.
Turkmenistan: just looking eastwards?
Turkmenistan's position as a potential natural-gas
supplier is rapidly evolving. The estimate of the
country's natural gas reserves skyrocketed from
about 2 tcm in 2007 to 17.5 tcm in 2015. This
huge difference underlines the profound under-
exploration of the country's natural gas resources,
and sheds light on the potential for further dis-
coveries.
Since the late 1990s, the US has actively pro-
moted the construction of the Trans-Caspian
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16. Reimbursement of capi-
tal expenditure, operational
expenditure and an agreed
remuneration fee.
president of Iran. In April 2015, after several
rounds of negotiations, Iran, the P5+1 (UN Secu-
rity Council permanent members the US, UK,
Russia, France and China plus Germany) and the
EU agreed a framework nuclear deal that, if
finalised (ideally by the end of June 2015), could
immediately lead to the lifting of energy sanctions
(Einhorn, 2015). This would completely reshape
Iran's energy sector, as international energy com-
panies line up to take advantage of the huge,
untapped, opportunities offered by the country's
oil and gas sector (Financial Times, 2015a).
Iran's legal framework is also due for revision.
Iran's oil minister Bijan Namdar Zanganeh said in
2013 he would reform the current framework,
bringing it closer to the model adopted in Iraq,
which could be more attractive for foreign
investors (The Economist, 2013). This reform will
most likely take place only once a final nuclear
deal is agreed.
Considering these potential major changes, the EU
should cooperate with Turkey to keep open the
possibility for future natural gas flows from Iran.
The prospects of natural gas exports from Iran to
the EU will mainly rely (because of geography) on
the Turkish-Iranian natural gas partnership. Con-
sidering the current difficult relationship between
these two partners (currently under international
arbitration over high prices for Iranian gas
(Azernews, 2015)), the EU should play the role of
moderator and propose the consolidation of Iran-
ian natural gas exports to Turkey and the opening-
up an export route to the EU via an upgraded
Turkish grid. A coordinated effort by the EU and
Turkey might succeed in persuading Iran that it
should not exclusively orient its future natural gas
export strategy eastwards (eg the Iran-Pakistan-
India pipeline) or focus on LNG, which might go to
Asia rather than Turkey (Tagliapietra, 2014a; Jalil-
vand, 2013).
Kurdistan Region of Iraq: a new player
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) has emerged
over the last few years as a potential new supplier
to the SGC. With an estimated range of 3-6 tcm of
natural gas resources (Kurdistan Regional Gov-
ernment, 2013), the KRI might be able to both sat-
isfy its domestic natural gas demand and to
natural gas supply from Turkmenistan to Europe.
Georgia will also be included at working-group
level because of its role as a key transit country
(European Commission, 2015c).
It is too early to tell whether this renewed cooper-
ation will be successful. However, this inclusive
cooperation scheme represents an example of
good practice that might also be applied by the EU
to the other potential suppliers of the SGC.
Iran: the main prize
With its 34 tcm of natural gas reserves, the largest
in the world according to BP, Iran is generally con-
sidered the main prize for the international gas
trade. Notwithstanding this rich natural endow-
ment, the country has not yet translated potential
into reality and, paradoxically, even continues to
have problems in meeting its own domestic natu-
ral gas demand (Tagliapietra, 2014a).
There are two main reasons for the under-exploita-
tion of Iran's natural gas resources: the interna-
tional sanctions regime and the country's legal
framework in relation to petroleum.
The international sanctions imposed on Iran by
the US, the United Nations (UN) and the EU in rela-
tion to the country's uranium enrichment pro-
gramme considerably delayed Iran's energy
development plans. In particular, the unilateral
sanctions applied to the country's energy sector
by the US and the EU since 2007 have completely
halted the activities of international energy com-
panies in Iran (Reuters, 2015).
Iran's legal framework, meanwhile, has deterred
international energy companies from investing.
Iran's constitution has provisions restricting for-
eign involvement in the country's energy
resources. To implement these, international
energy companies are obliged to develop oil or gas
fields with their own capital and then hand them
over to the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC)
once production starts and wait to be reimbursed
by NIOC16. These terms are highly unattractive for
international energy companies.
However, there have been developments since the
2013 election of the moderate Hassan Rouhani as
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export volumes to Turkey and Europe.
Turkey plays an important role in this area, geopo-
litically and commercially. Turkey and the Kurdis-
tan Regional Government in Erbil signed a
natural-gas sales agreement in 2013 for the
export of 4 bcm/y by 2017, 10 bcm/y by 2020
and 20 bcm/y thereafter (Reuters, 2013).
Building on this agreement, the Anglo-Turkish
company Genel Energy plc reached in November
2014 an agreement with the  Kurdistan Regional
Government for the development of two natural
gas fields, Miran and Bina Bawi, which Genel
Energy expects to deliver gross mean sales of
about 240 bcm of gas (Genel Energy, 2015).
Considering the potential resource endowment of
the region, natural gas exports from the KRI to
Europe via Turkey might also well materialise in
the medium term, after the KRI reaches natural
gas self-sufficiency and after the Kurdistan
Regional Government fulfils its obligations to
Turkey. However, such a development will depend
on internal regulatory stability and regional
geopolitics.
A major barrier to the development of the KRI's
energy resources has been the tensions between
Erbil and Baghdad over the distribution of oil rev-
enues. In December 2014 the two parties finalised
a deal to ease these tensions (Financial Times,
2014), which might ultimately pave the way for a
new Iraqi federal hydrocarbon law, which would
enhance foreign investors' confidence in the
country (Korani, 2014).
Of course, the unpredictable evolution of regional
geopolitics and the security situation in Iraq will
ultimately determine the pace of this
development.
Because of the crucial role of Turkey in the KRI, the
EU should cooperate with Turkey, the Kurdistan
Regional Government and the Iraqi federal gov-
ernment in Baghdad to secure future exports of
natural gas to Europe. This cooperation would not
only be beneficial to the EU, but also to Turkey,
because although Turkey has diplomatic leverage
in Erbil, it does not in Baghdad, where the EU is
instead a well-established interlocutor.
A POTENTIAL WAY FORWARD FOR THE SOUTHERN
GAS CORRIDOR
Our review of the SGC's potential suppliers has
shown both the complexity of the regional natu-
ral-gas dynamics and the substantial benefits that
could arise if the EU and Turkey work together. We
argue that the EU’s and Turkey’s political leverage
in the region is to a great extent complementary.
One indicator of this is that while the EU provides
significant bilateral official development assis-
tance to Iran, Iraq and Georgia, Turkey is more
engaged in this sense in Azerbaijan and Turk-
menistan (Figure 5).
Assessing future export potential via the SGC to
Europe is a highly speculative exercise. The 10
bcm/y by 2020 from Azerbaijan is the only certain
input. Beyond that, estimates depend on the evo-
lution of the regional geopolitical situation.
In order to provide an idea of the potential orders
of magnitude, we assume an average scenario in
which each prospective supplier will contribute
with a volume corresponding to the start-up
volume of Azerbaijan (10 bcm/y) by 2025-30.
In this scenario, the SGC might ultimately be
expanded to 50 bcm/y, which would be a signifi-
cant volume entering EU natural gas markets, espe-
cially southern and eastern European markets.
But how can the EU proactively secure this transi-
tion? On the basis of our analysis, we make two
key recommendations.
0
20
40
60
80
100
Azerbaijan Iran Iraq Turkmenistan Georgia
Turkey
EU
Figure 5: Bilateral Oﬃcial Development
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Source: Bruegel based on OECD.
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structure to accommodate new Iranian and Kur-
distan supplies to Turkey and the EU. These poten-
tial volumes might be channelled to the
Turkish-European border via the Turkish natural
gas grid. This would require an upgrade to the
existing network, which Turkey will need to do in
any case, considering its growing natural gas
demand.
Another focus of cooperation could be the future
expansion of TANAP in order to accommodate
additional volumes from Azerbaijan and new vol-
umes from Turkmenistan to Turkey and the EU.
These volumes might reach the Turkish-European
border via an extension of TANAP, which is
designed to be expandable to accommodate vol-
umes of up to 60 bcm/y.
Considering the common strategic interest in
having a reliable natural gas infrastructure, the EU
might team-up with Turkey to establish dedicated
financial mechanisms that will stimulate these
investments. In particular, alongside its already
well established activity in the Turkey (European
Investment Bank, 2014), the European Invest-
ment Bank (EIB) might provide a wide set of
financing tools to attract private or institutional
investors. These tools could include i) guarantees
and securitisation; ii) equity and fund invest-
ments; iii) project loans.
A new approach to the SGC
The aim of the EU-Turkey joint effort should not be
to provide new major supply alternatives for Turk-
ish and European natural gas markets in the short
term. This would be unfeasible, as an expansion
of the SGC will realistically not take place before
2025-30.
The aim should rather be to lay the foundations for
the expansion of the SGC in the medium term. A
partnership that is tested through cooperation on
relatively limited gas volumes with up to four dif-
ferent supply sources will do much for Europe’s
long-term security of supply. It will enable Europe
to quickly increase import capacity from those
sources depending on their evolution – we cannot
foresee the political situation five or ten years
ahead in any of the source countries. And invest-
ing today in a set of future options to increase
EU-Turkey energy diplomacy taskforces
The EU should establish dedicated energy-diplo-
macy taskforces with Turkey and each supplier.
This would allow the EU and Turkey to fully make
use of their complementary diplomatic leverage
in the region, and thus have the greatest chance of
overcoming the obstacles to the regional natural
gas trade. The recent EU-Turkey coordinated
approach to Turkmenistan represents a first step
in the right direction, but this cooperation should
turn into a permanent platform for dialogue
between the high-level representatives of all the
parties involved.
The four taskforces (EU-Turkey-Azerbaijan; EU-
Turkey-Turkmenistan; EU-Turkey-Iran; EU-Turkey-
Kurdistan) should be the key pillars of a new
EU-Turkey strategic energy partnership. These
taskforces might be implemented within the
common framework of the EU-Turkey Strategic
High Level Energy Dialogue that was started in
March 2015 by Commission Vice-President for
Energy Union Maros Šefcovic and Turkish Minister
for Energy and Natural Resources Taner Yildiz
(European Commission, 2015b).
Financing for infrastructure development
To truly engage Turkey in a new strategic energy
partnership, common solutions should also be
found to infrastructure shortcomings. After the
Nabucco experience, cooperation in the field
should first focus on small projects rather than
large ones. A starting point could be the infra-
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Figure 6: A scenario for the Southern Gas
Corridor (bcm)
Source: Bruegel.
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Europe's imports from four different sources can
be done without having to commit to importing gas
that is currently not (and might never be) needed.
After all, current demand is back to the level of the
mid-1990s (Eurogas, 2014; BP, 2014), European
companies are committed to purchasing more
than 125 bcm of Russian natural gas in 2020 and
around 70 bcm in 2030 (Dickel et al, 2014, p.4),
and domestic production is expected to continue
to decline during the 2020s. Taking these factors
into account, it seems likely that it will only be
post-2025 (if at all) that there could be significant
demand from European natural gas markets for
new supplies via the SGC.
In the shorter term, reinforced EU-Turkey cooper-
ation over the SGC could also be important con-
sidering the new geopolitical landscape of the
region, with Russia proposing a major energy
cooperation project to Turkey: Turkish Stream.
TURKISH STREAM: THE NEW REALITY?
On 1 December 2014, Russian president Vladimir
Putin surprised the energy world by announcing,
during a state visit to Turkey, the demise of South
Stream and a new project to supply Turkish and
south-eastern European markets from 2019 while
completely bypassing Ukraine: Turkish Stream.
Turkish Stream would be a 63 bcm/y pipeline, run-
ning 660 km across the Black Sea, from the
Russkaya compressing station to the north west
of Turkey, and then continuing 250 km across
Turkish territory to the Turkey/Greece border
(Gazprom, 2015).
Turkish Stream could be advanced quickly by cap-
italising on work already done on South Stream.
Massive investment has already been made in the
‘Russian Southern Corridor’ (Gazprom, 2012). With
South Stream pipes already delivered to Varna
port in prepration for laying, and with pipe-laying
ships already present in the Black Sea, the addi-
tional cost for Gazprom to build Turkish Stream is
limited.
On 7 May 2015, Gazprom CEO Alexi Miller said
during a visit to Ankara that Russia and Turkey
would start to trade natural gas via Turkish Stream
in December 2016 (Financial Times, 2015b). This
could lead to the 14 bcm of Russian natural gas
currently contracted to be delivered via the Trans-
Balkan pipeline to Turkey (via Ukraine, Moldova,
Romania and Bulgaria) being completely re-chan-
nelled via Turkish Stream.
The development of Turkish Stream, via which
Russia intends to supply all the gas it currently
supplies via Ukraine, will mainly depend on the
ability of Gazprom to renegotiate its contracts with
European companies (changing delivery points
and, in turn, prices), and the development of new
infrastructure to deliver the natural gas from the
Turkish/Greek border to destination markets. 
Of course, both these issues will have a high polit-
ical profile, considering that the EU will most likely
take a negative position on the project, in order to
keep alternative diversification options open and
to not undermine Ukraine by helping Russia
bypass its pipeline system.
The impact of Turkish Stream on the EU-Turkey
energy relationship
Turkish Stream will be a pipeline wanted, financed,
constructed and operated by Russia for its own
strategic interest. Turkey's role will be minor.
Therefore, from an EU perspective, Turkish Stream
will be more about the EU-Russia energy relation-
ship than the EU-Turkey energy relationship.
Figure 7: Turkish Stream
Source: Bruegel based on Gazprom.
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In contrast to the SGC, which offers the EU and
Turkey broad scope for cooperation in terms of
energy diplomacy in the region and infrastructure
financing, Turkish Stream seems to offer no poten-
tial cooperation avenues for the two players.
CONCLUSIONS
Our analysis has shown that, taking into account
the new regional energy and geopolitical realities,
cooperation on the SGC should represent the basis
of a new EU-Turkey strategic energy partnership.
Turkish Stream, meanwhile, would rather be a
potential source of political disagreement
between the EU and Turkey.
Considering the momentum in Europe for natural
gas supply diversification in the aftermath of the
2014 Ukraine crisis, the EU should rapidly estab-
lish a new SGC cooperation platform with Turkey,
on the basis of a new, inclusive, approach that will
respond to the strategic interests of both players.
The aim should be the creation of favourable con-
ditions to allow energy companies to plan new
commercially viable projects in the region.
Cooperation on the SGC could be beneficial for the
EU, Turkey and each potential supplier in the
region. For the EU it would allow the implementa-
tion of a long-pursued diversification strategy
characterised by flexibility and scalability over
time. For Turkey, it would represent an opportunity
to improve its own gas-supply security, by scal-
ing-up imports from regional suppliers and unlock-
ing new sources. In addition, by bundling supplies
from up to six sources (the four SGC sources plus
Russia and potentially the Eastern Mediter-
ranean), Turkey could develop a larger strategic
role in the energy politics of the region, which
could pay commercial and political dividends. For
each potential supplier in the region, the SGC
would allow the diversification of their respective
natural-gas export portfolios and would increase
their revenues from natural-gas exports.
For the EU and Turkey, it is also important to under-
line that a new joint initiative focused on the SGC
would also be about rebuilding mutual trust and
geopolitical cooperation between the two players.
A joint diplomatic and financial effort to achieve
common goals in the region might ultimately have
a positive impact on the overall EU-Turkey rela-
tionship, at a time when Turkey seems to have lost
its European momentum and appears to look
increasingly eastwards.
EU-Turkey Strategic
High Level Energy Dialogue
EU-Turkey Gas Infrastructure
Financing Initiative
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Figure 8: A new EU-Turkey Strategic Energy
Partnership: a potential institutional structure
Source: Bruegel.
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